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EQUAL PROTECTION “IN FLUX”: THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INABILITY TO 
CLARIFY A STANDARD FOR CLASS-OF-ONE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS IN DEL 
MARCELLE v. BROWN COUNTY CORP. 
Andrew Martinez Whitson* 
Abstract: On May 17, 2012, in Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc split three ways 
on what standard to apply in class-of-one equal protection cases. The 
judges were concerned about how to account for a state actor’s motive 
while also ensuring that low-level government officials’ discretionary au-
thority is adequately protected. The Seventh Circuit could have balanced 
these concerns appropriately had they adopted Judge Wood’s proposed 
framework, which evaluates a state actor’s behavior using a rational basis 
standard and allows the defendant’s motive to be considered, but relieves 
the plaintiff of the burden of specifically alleging the state actor’s motiva-
tion. This standard would have been easy for the courts to apply, would 
provide much needed clarity on this issue, and would have most effec-
tively balanced the rights of victims of discrimination with the need to af-
ford low-level state officials’ latitude to make discretionary decisions. 
Introduction 
 On September 13, 2010, Lewis Del Marcelle brought a federal civil 
rights lawsuit against Brown County, the Village of Ashwaubenon, and 
their respective executives for denying him and his wife equal protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Del Marcelle claimed that his 
constitutional right to equal protection was violated when local law en-
forcement in Brown County, Wisconsin, ignored his complaints about a 
motorcycle gang’s persistent and severe harassment of him and his 
wife.2 As a result of the harassment, Del Marcelle claimed that he and 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013). 
1 See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 888 (7th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 
(lead opinion), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 654; Complaint at 1–3, Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. 
Corp., No. 1:10-cv-00785-WCG (E.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 2010) (Bloomberg Law) [hereinafter 
Complaint]. 
2 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 888; Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
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his wife sold their home and moved to the Village of Ashwaubenon, 
Wisconsin.3 Nevertheless, the gang followed them to their new loca-
tion.4 
 Shortly after Del Marcelle filed his pro se complaint, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the defen-
dants’ motion to dismiss.5 The court reasoned that Del Marcelle’s com-
plaint could not survive because it merely stated that the police were 
not properly doing their job.6 In addition, the district court noted that 
the equal protection claim failed because it did not allege that the 
plaintiffs belonged to a protected class.7 
 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit noted that 
Del Marcelle’s complaint could have been interpreted as a class-of-one 
equal protection claim in which the defendants had arbitrarily pro-
vided less police protection for the plaintiffs specifically.8 Because the 
panel proposed a new standard for class-of-one equal protection claims, 
the full court decided to rehear the case en banc.9 The en banc court, 
however, failed to come to a majority decision on a standard to apply in 
class-of-one equal protection cases.10 The judges differed in articulating 
a limiting principle that would protect government officials’ discretion-
ary decisions while still giving citizens a forum to address discrimina-
tion in class-of-one cases.11 Additionally, the court split evenly on 
whether to remand the case and allow the plaintiff to replead.12 Be-
cause it takes a majority of the court to reverse a judgment, the lower 
court’s dismissal of Del Marcelle’s claim was affirmed.13 
 Nine out of the ten judges on the Seventh Circuit properly recog-
nized that the defendants’ motive should be a factor in creating a stan-
dard for class-of-one equal protection claims, but the judges were un-
                                                                                                                      
3 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 888; id. at 906 (Wood, J., dissenting); Complaint, supra 
note 1, at 3. 
4 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 888; Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. 
5 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 888; Order of Dismissal at 1–2, Del Marcelle v. Brown 
Cnty. Corp., No. 1:10-cv-00785-WCG (E.D. Wis. Oct. 13, 2010) (Bloomberg Law) [hereinaf-
ter Order of Dismissal]; Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. 
6 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 888; Order of Dismissal, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
7 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 888; Order of Dismissal, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
8 Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 888. 
9 Id. at 889. 
10 Id. 
11 See id.; id. at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring); id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
12 See id. at 889 (lead opinion). 
13 Id. at 888–89. 
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able to agree on the appropriate standard to apply.14 The Seventh Cir-
cuit, however, should have adopted the standard set forth by Judge 
Wood in her dissenting opinion.15 This standard would require a plain-
tiff to show that the state actor lacked a rational basis for its discrimina-
tory treatment, but does not require the plaintiff to make a specific 
showing of the defendant’s motive.16 Judge Wood’s proposed standard 
would have adequately protected low-level government officials in their 
capacity as discretionary decisionmakers while also giving all citizens a 
meaningful forum to confront those officials when they are singled out 
for unjust discriminatory treatment.17 
I. The Dismissal of Del Marcelle’s Pro Se Complaint 
 Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp. originated from a dispute be-
tween Lewis and Ellen Del Marcelle and members of a motorcycle 
gang, whose associates included law enforcement personnel.18 The mo-
torcycle gang harassed Del Marcelle and his wife over the course of sev-
eral years, including allegedly threatening the Del Marcelles over the 
phone, placing explosive devices next to their home, attempting to run 
over Del Marcelle, and subjecting the Del Marcelles to very loud muf-
fler sounds.19 The harassment was so severe that Ellen Del Marcelle at-
tempted suicide.20 
 The situation forced Del Marcelle and his wife to move from their 
long-time home in Denmark, Wisconsin.21 Nevertheless, the motorcycle 
gang followed them and continued the harassment.22 Both Del Marcelle 
and members of the gang filed numerous harassment complaints 
against each other with the Sheriff’s Department.23 According to Del 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 889; id. at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring); id. at 913 
(Wood, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
16 See id. 
17 See id. at 913–15. 
18 See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 906 (7th Cir. 2012) (per cu-
riam) (Wood, J., dissenting) (explaining that facts are to be accepted as set forth by the 
plaintiff), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 654; Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
19 Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 906 (Wood, J., dissenting); Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
20 Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 906 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
21 See id. at 888 (lead opinion); Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. Judge Wood’s dissenting 
opinion refers to the Town of Denmark as Glenmore. Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 906 (Wood, 
J., dissenting). 
22 Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 906 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
23 Id. at 906–07; Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant Lewis D. 
Del Marcelle at 8, Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10–
3426) (Bloomberg Law). 
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Marcelle, the police ignored most of his complaints and even issued Del 
Marcelle a citation for a gang member’s complaints against him.24 Del 
Marcelle claimed that the law enforcement agencies protected the mo-
torcycle gang because an alleged member of the gang was a former law 
enforcement officer and the gang’s leader was related to an officer in 
the Brown County Sherriff’s Department.25 
 On September 13, 2010, Del Marcelle filed a pro se civil rights 
complaint against Brown County, its County Executive, the Village of 
Ashwaubenon, and the Village’s President.26 The complaint alleged 
that Del Marcelle was denied equal protection of the law when the po-
lice failed to respond to his complaints about the gang.27 Shortly there-
after, Brown County and its County Executive filed a motion to dis-
miss.28 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
granted the motion and dismissed the suit against all four defendants, 
explaining that Del Marcelle’s complaint merely alleged that the police 
did not adequately perform their job in protecting him from private 
violence and thus, that Del Marcelle had failed to state an actionable 
claim.29 The district court also reasoned that Del Marcelle did not have 
an Equal Protection Clause claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because he never alleged membership in a protected class.30 In dismiss-
ing Del Marcelle’s complaint, the district court did not consider a class-
of-one theory.31 A class-of-one theory allows a plaintiff to make out an 
equal protection violation claim without pleading that the discrimina-
tory treatment was based on the plaintiff’s membership in a specific 
group, such as a racial or religious minority.32 
 Del Marcelle filed a timely notice of appeal in October 2010.33 A 
three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rec-
ognized that Del Marcelle’s complaint could be interpreted as a “class-
of-one” discrimination claim because the police had arbitrarily pro-
                                                                                                                      
24 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 906 (Wood, J., dissenting); Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. 
25 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 906 (Wood, J., dissenting); Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. 
26 Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 907 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. at 888 (lead opinion). 
28 See id. at 907 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
29 See id. at 888 (lead opinion) (stating that the district court correctly ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to provide adequate police protection 
against private violence). 
30 See id. at 888–89; Order of Dismissal at 1–2, Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 1:10-cv-
00785-WCG (E.D. Wis. Oct. 13, 2010) (Bloomberg Law) [hereinafter Order of Dismissal]. 
31 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 888–89. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 888. 
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vided less protection to him specifically.34 The panel, however, deter-
mined that without allegations of personal animosity toward the plain-
tiff specifically, the claim still failed.35 After the panel circulated its 
opinion proposing a new standard for class-of-one equal protection 
claims to the entire court, the Seventh Circuit decided to rehear the 
case en banc.36 
 Despite appointing counsel to Del Marcelle for the en banc hear-
ing, the Seventh Circuit could not reach a majority decision.37 The 
judges split three ways, each proposing a different standard of review 
for class-of-one equal protection claims.38 Additionally, the court tied 
five-to-five on the issue of whether to allow Del Marcelle to replead, 
thus affirming the district court’s dismissal.39 Although the Seventh 
Circuit does not customarily publish opinions when a tie vote affirms 
the lower court’s decision, a majority of the judges decided that an 
opinion was needed to provide guidance in future class-of-one equal 
protection suits.40 
II. The Seventh Circuit’s Inability to Come to a Majority 
Decision While Balancing Precedent and Policy 
 Although all ten Seventh Circuit judges agreed that Del Marcelle’s 
pro se complaint failed to state a claim, the court remained divided on 
two issues.41 First, the court could not agree on the standard of liability 
that should be applied in class-of-one equal protection cases.42 Second, 
the court could not agree whether to affirm the district court’s dis-
missal or to remand the case to allow Del Marcelle to replead.43 
A. Three Standards for Asserting Class-of-One Equal Protection Claims 
 The Seventh Circuit struggled to articulate a standard for class-of-
one equal protection claims that would comport with the framework 
                                                                                                                      
34 Id. at 888–89. 
35 Id. at 889. 
36 Id. 
37 Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 889. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 888–89. 
40 See id. at 888 (per curiam). 
41 See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2012) (per cu-
riam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 654; id. at 917 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
42 See id. at 889 (lead opinion); id. at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring); id. at 906 
(Wood, J., dissenting). 
43 See id. at 899–900 (lead opinion); id. at 905 (Easterbrook, C.J. concurring); id. at 906 
(Wood, J., dissenting). 
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established by the Supreme Court in the 2000 case, Village of Willowbrook 
v. Olech and the 2008 case, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture.44 
In Olech, the Village agreed to grant the plaintiffs’ request to connect 
their home to a municipal water system only if the Olechs granted the 
Village an easement on their property that was larger than customarily 
required.45 After months of dispute, the Village admitted that the larger 
easement condition had no practical justification; the Olechs con-
tended that the Village merely meant to punish them for having suc-
cessfully sued the Village in the past.46 
 The Seventh Circuit in Olech held that one’s right to Equal Protec-
tion under the law could be violated when the differential treatment 
was caused by totally illegitimate animus.47 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the differential treat-
ment’s irrational and wholly arbitrary nature justified a class-of-one 
equal protection claim.48 The Court, however, specifically avoided 
adopting a limiting principle dealing with the motive of the discrimina-
tory treatment.49 
 The Supreme Court grappled with a similar issue in Engquist v. 
Oregon Department of Agriculture, which involved a public employee who 
brought a class-of-one equal protection claim after effectively being laid 
off.50 The plaintiff claimed that her employer fired her for “arbitrary, 
vindictive, and malicious reasons” in response to her repeated dis-
agreements with a co-worker.51 The Court held that public employees 
cannot bring class-of-one equal protection claims against their employ-
ers regarding discretionary decisions to hire and fire employees.52 
Though this decision applies only to the hiring and firing of employees 
in the public sector, the Court reasoned that public officials are often 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id. at 899 (lead opinion); id. at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring); id. at 913 
(Wood, J., dissenting); see also Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 
(2008); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000) (per curiam). 
45 Olech, 528 U.S. at 563; Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 890. 
46 See Olech, 528 U.S. at 563; Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 890. 
47 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 890; Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th 
Cir. 1998). 
48 See Olech, 528 U.S. at 565. 
49 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 890; see also Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 (reasoning that allega-
tions of differential treatment that were irrational and wholly arbitrary is “quite apart from 
. . . subjective motivation” and is “sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional 
equal protection analysis,” thus not ruling on the alternative “subjective ill will” theory 
relied on by the Seventh Circuit). 
50 See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 594–95. 
51 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
52 See id. at 609. 
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granted wide discretionary authority and that use of that authority 
should not lead to a lawsuit every time it is exercised.53 
 In light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Olech and Engquist, the 
Seventh Circuit judges in Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp. tried to craft 
standards that protected public officials’ discretionary authority without 
creating a limiting principle that demanded the presence of “ill-will” or 
“illegitimate animus.”54 Judge Posner’s lead opinion, in which three 
other judges joined, proposed that for class-of-one equal protection 
claims, the plaintiff must plead and prove that he was subject to inten-
tional discriminatory treatment by state actors, that the treatment was 
not justified by any public duty, and that there was an improper personal 
motive for the treatment.55 Judge Posner reasoned that including an 
element addressing the actor’s improper personal motives would fur-
ther protect a government official’s discretionary authority because 
there is often no “rational basis” for discretionary decisions.56 The im-
proper personal motive requirement means that the plaintiff has to al-
lege more than merely some bad motive.57 Rather, the complaint must 
allege a personal reason for the defendant’s discriminatory actions, such 
as animus or personal gain through corruption or larceny.58 
 Unlike the standard proposed by Judge Posner, Judge Wood’s 
standard, set forth in her dissenting opinion, did not require a specific 
showing of the defendant’s motive.59 Instead, Judge Wood, joined by 
four other judges, proposed that the plaintiff’s complaint must make 
plausible allegations that the plaintiff was the victim of intentional dis-
criminatory treatment by a state actor, that the state actor had no ra-
tional basis for singling out the plaintiff, and that the treatment re-
sulted in the plaintiff’s injury.60 Judge Wood reasoned that having only 
a rational basis requirement would protect state officials’ discretionary 
authority sufficiently without creating a need to show the defendant’s 
motive.61 Judge Wood’s standard centered on the premise that a state 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 895–97; see also Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603–04 (comparing 
the authority granted to public employers and police officers to make “discretionary deci-
sionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments”). 
54 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 899; id. at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring); id. at 911–
13 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
55 Id. at 899 (lead opinion). 
56 See id. at 895–99. 
57 See id. at 899. 
58 See id. at 892, 899. 
59 See id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
60 Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
61 See id. at 917. 
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actor’s decision, based on discretionary authority, is presumed to be 
rational and therefore constitutional.62 Thus, under this standard, the 
plaintiff bears the burden to plead facts that indicate how the discre-
tionary decision was in fact not rational.63 This showing might be 
achieved by pleading facts that demonstrate personal animus.64 In addi-
tion, the more discretion afforded to the official, the more difficult it is 
for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the decision was not a legitimate 
exercise of the official’s discretionary authority.65 
 Chief Judge Easterbrook, in his concurring opinion, took a differ-
ent approach that did not take into account the defendant’s intent or 
motive at all.66 Instead, Chief Judge Easterbrook read the Olech decision 
to mean that the rational basis test applies to class-of-one equal protec-
tion claims and that the test asks only whether a rational basis for the 
state official’s actions can be conceived.67 Under this standard, the de-
fendant’s discriminatory treatment of others does not warrant a lawsuit 
unless there is no conceivable rational basis for the treatment, even if 
there was a discretionary decision made for personally malicious rea-
sons.68 
B. The Seventh Circuit Splits Evenly on Whether to Remand or Affirm Dismissal 
of Del Marcelle’s Complaint 
 Ultimately, the judges split five-to-five on whether to remand the 
case and allow Del Marcelle to replead.69 This tie led the Seventh Cir-
cuit to affirm the district court’s dismissal of Del Marcelle’s pro se com-
plaint.70 Judge Posner concluded that Del Marcelle’s claim solely in-
volved police discretion, and not personal motives.71 Remanding the 
case to allow him to replead would therefore be pointless because the 
facts did not indicate any personal motivations by the police.72 Chief 
Judge Easterbrook concurred in the decision not to allow Del Marcelle 
to replead because the Chief Judge’s proposed standard requiring a 
                                                                                                                      
62 See id. at 913. 
63 See id. at 911. 
64 See id. at 913. 
65 See id. at 915. 
66 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring). No other judges 
joined Chief Judge Easterbrook’s concurring opinion. Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 888 (per curiam). 
70 Id. 
71 See id. at 899–900 (lead opinion). 
72 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 899–900. 
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conceivable rational basis for the discriminatory treatment was clearly 
met.73 Chief Judge Easterbrook pointed to two conceivable rational 
bases for the plaintiff’s treatment by law enforcement: limited resources 
to investigate all of Del Marcelle’s complaints, or the police depart-
ment’s conclusion that Del Marcelle exaggerated or imagined the prob-
lems that he reported.74 
 Judge Wood’s dissenting opinion, while proposing a standard simi-
lar to Judge Posner’s, concluded that Del Marcelle should be afforded 
an opportunity to replead and meet the correct standard.75 Despite 
some of the known facts weighing against Del Marcelle’s case, the dis-
sent recognized that the full factual record had yet to be developed.76 
In addition, Judge Wood argued that Del Marcelle should get another 
chance because the state of the law is unsettled, the plaintiff had been 
proceeding pro se, and because the “the general rule favor[s] an op-
portunity to replead.”77 
 The Seventh Circuit’s tie vote on whether to allow Del Marcelle to 
replead had two main effects.78 First, because the district court’s dis-
missal was affirmed, Del Marcelle was foreclosed from seeking further 
judicial redress for the injuries he allegedly sustained at the hands of 
the police.79 Second, the plurality’s proposed standard of review for 
class-of-one equal protection claims is not binding on lower courts or 
public officials.80 
III. Judge Wood’s Rational Basis Standard 
 The Seventh Circuit’s failure in Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp. to 
come to a controlling decision on a standard to apply in class-of-one 
                                                                                                                      
73 See id. at 900, 905 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring). 
74 Id. at 900. 
75 See id. at 900; id. at 906 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
76 See id. at 917–18 (Wood, J., dissenting). There were inconsistencies with Del 
Marcelle’s claims regarding whether the police failed to respond to his complaints. See id. 
For example, the police had in fact investigated the incident where an alleged gang mem-
ber tried to run Del Marcelle over by interviewing the car’s driver and several witnesses. See 
id. The police concluded that Del Marcelle actually provoked the incident by throwing a 
rock through the car’s windshield resulting in shards of glass landing on the driver’s baby. 
See id.; Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Brown County Corp. and Tom Hinz at 27, Del 
Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10–3426) (Bloomberg 
Law). 
77 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 918 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
78 See id. at 888–89 (lead opinion); id. at 907 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
79 See id. at 907 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
80 See id. at 906. 
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equal protection cases further postpones needed clarity on this issue.81 
The court should have adopted the standard set out in Judge Wood’s 
dissenting opinion, as it would most effectively balance the rights of 
victims of discrimination with the need to afford low-level state officials 
latitude to make discretionary decisions.82 
 A standard that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the state 
actor lacked a rational basis for singling them out, but without showing 
the defendant’s specific motivation, allows courts to make individual-
ized decisions about when discretion becomes unconstitutional dis-
crimination.83 This rational basis standard enables the court to consider 
the wrongful motivations of a state actor without precluding justice for 
the victim of the discrimination solely because he or she cannot point 
to a personal motivation.84 At the same time, the standard assumes that 
the state actor’s discretionary decision is rational; the more discretion 
the official has, the higher the burden is to show that they were not act-
ing within their discretionary authority.85 The heavy burden this stan-
dard places on plaintiffs in overcoming this assumption negates the 
criticism that Judge Wood’s rational basis standard will inundate the 
court with similar claims.86 
 Implementing a standard that occasionally asks police officers, 
who have broad discretionary authority, to defend their decisions is not 
unprecedented.87 Therefore, a standard that does not completely 
shield police officers’ discretionary decisions from scrutiny will not 
hinder any legitimate purpose in law enforcement.88 
 In contrast, Chief Judge Easterbrook’s proposed standard provides 
too much protection to police officers’ discretionary decisions.89 The 
Chief Judge’s standard for class-of-one equal protection claims simply 
asks whether a rational basis can be conceived in defense of the state 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 906 (7th Cir. 2012) (per cu-
riam) (Wood, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 654. 
82 See id. at 913–15. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at 918. 
85 See id. at 914–15. 
86 See id. at 893 (lead opinion); id. at 914–15 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
87 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 916 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing Hanes v. Zurick, 578 
F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that police officers’ actions are frequently subject 
to Constitutional constraint, giving examples of police needing “articulable facts” to stop a 
suspect (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)) and when evaluating police seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))). 
88 See id. at 916–17. 
89 See id. at 905 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring). 
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actor.90 If a rational basis can be conceived, the state actor is not liable 
under a class-of-one equal protection analysis.91 This standard does not 
allow courts to consider discriminatory intent or motives by state ac-
tors.92 Chief Judge Easterbrook’s standard would make it more difficult 
for a plaintiff’s claim to survive a motion to dismiss because it does not 
consider motive.93 Hence, any conceivable rational basis could effec-
tively defeat the plaintiff’s claim, regardless of whether there is mali-
cious motivation.94 
 Similarly, the personal motive requirement in Judge Posner’s pro-
posed standard would be too constraining on potential class-of-one 
equal protection claims.95 Judge Posner’s standard requires that the 
plaintiff show that the state actor’s discriminatory treatment was based 
on personal motivations unrelated to their public duties rather than a 
rational basis for their actions.96 Such a stringent test, however, forces 
the plaintiff to cite the precise motivation behind his victimization.97 
This test may preclude meritorious cases from being heard when plain-
tiffs cannot meet such a specific pleading requirement.98 
 The Seventh Circuit should have adopted Judge Wood’s standard 
for class-of-one claims because it is easy to administer and soundly shel-
ters police discretion while protecting the ability of those who have 
been unjustly discriminated against to bring claims.99 Judge Wood’s 
standard would negate the need for a judge to speculate as to why a 
defendant chose to discriminate, and instead allows the facts surround-
ing the defendant’s actions to demonstrate the motive for those ac-
tions.100 In addition, Judge Wood’s standard appropriately presumes 
that discretionary decisions by state actors are rational.101 Therefore, 
the defendant does not bear the burden of explaining how a given de-
cision was not unconstitutionally discriminatory.102 Had the Seventh 
Circuit adopted Judge Wood’s standard for class-of-one equal protec-
tion claims, it would have properly guarded low-level state officials’ dis-
                                                                                                                      
90 See id. at 900. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring). 
94 See id. 
95 See id. at 899 (lead opinion). 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 918 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
98 See id. at 899 (lead opinion). 
99 See Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
100 See id. at 918. 
101 See id. at 913–15. 
102 See id. at 915. 
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cretionary authority, as well as given adequate protection to citizens 
and certainty to courts faced with this category of cases.103 
Conclusion 
 The Seventh Circuit’s split on the issue of whether to allow the 
plaintiff in Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp. to replead resulted in a 
failure to come to a controlling decision on what standard to apply in 
class-of-one equal protection claims. The Seventh Circuit should have 
adopted Judge Wood’s standard for class-of-one equal protection claims 
requiring that the plaintiff plead plausible allegations, which can in-
clude the defendant’s motive, to demonstrate that the state actor 
lacked a rational basis. Judge Wood’s standard not only would have 
been easier for lower courts to administer, but also would have bal-
anced low-level government officials’ discretionary authority with the 
need to grant a forum for those unjustly discriminated against by state 
actors. 
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